The Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution by Kalt, Brian C.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-1997
The Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution
Brian C. Kalt
Michigan State University College of Law, kalt@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution, 2 NEXUS 11 (1997).
HeinOnline -- 2 NEXUS 11 1997
The Presidential Privilege 
Against Prosecution 
Akhil Reed Amar * & Brian C. Kalt" 
There are ... incidental powers, 
belonging to the executive 
department, which are necessarily 
implied from the nature of the 
functions, which are confided to it. 
Among these, must necessarily be 
included the power to perform them, 
without any obstruction or 
impediment whatsoever. The 
President cannot, therefore, be liable 
to arrest, imprisonment, or 
detention, while he is in the discharge 
of the duties of his office ... 
- Justice Joseph Story, 1833 I 
text, history, structure, and precedent 
supports the conclusion that Justice Story 
reached: Sitting Presidents cannot be 
prosecuted. 
This privilege does not place 
Presidents above the law; they can be held 
accountable for their actions after they leave 
office, and they can be impeached to hasten 
this. The privilege does not make Presidents 
imperial; their special status is ultimately 
traceable to the rights of the American 
People. Nor does the privilege clash with 
the structure of American constitutional 
Can a sitting President ever be government; the President is constitutionally 
criminally prosecuted (outside an distinct from other, prosecutable officials. 
impeachment court)? The question has been 
debated-sometimes hotly, sometimes The President Is Unique 
coolly-since the beginning of the Republic. That last point is a good place to 
Although the long pedigree of this debate begin. An obvious counter-argument, a 
suggests that reasonable people can disagree, reason to think that a sitting President might 
we believe that the best view of constitutional be susceptible to prosecution, is that 
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members of Congress, federal judges, Vice 
Presidents, cabinet officers, and governors 
can all be prosecuted. But the Constitution 
does not view the President as it does these 
other officials. As Alex Bickel put it, "In the 
presidency is embodied the continuity and 
indestructibility of the state.' '2 It is embodied 
in the presidency uniquely. 
How exactly is the President so 
different, constitutionally speaking? First and 
most important, the 
capacity and has largely fungible personnel. 
Even if, say, an entire circuit court were 
arrested, other judges could sit by 
designation ifneed be. When a governor is 
prosecuted, much ofthe executive power of 
the state can still be exercised in her absence. 
When, by contrast, the President is being 
prosecuted, the presidency itself is being 
prosecuted. When the President is 
substantially distracted from his job, he is half-
President is a unitary If [the President] 
absent and his job goes 
is half-undone. If he is 
executive. The arrested, so too is the arrested, so too is the 
Constitution vests the executive branch of the executive branch ofthe 
nation's legislative government. 
authority In 535 
Senators and Representatives, its judicial 
authority in over 1300 Article III judges, but 
its entire executive power in a single 
President. Governors are elected separately 
from other state executive officials -
attorney generals, treasurers, and secretaries 
of state - and thus do not embody the full 
executive power oftheir states. 
Congress can (and does) function 
as if it were whole even when up to half of 
its members are absent; prosecuting an 
individual member of Congress thus does 
not interfere unduly with the legislature's usual 
function. The judiciary, too, maintains excess 
government. 
Second, the 
President is national. Members of Congress 
and governors are elected to represent 
districts or states. Judges are unelected and 
represent, essentially, the pieces of paper that 
it is their job to interpret and apply. The 
President is elected by the entire polity and 
represents all 260 million citizens of the 
United States of America. If the President 
were prosecuted, the steward of all the 
People would be hijacked from his duties 
by an official oifew (or none) of them. 
Third, the President's job requires 
immediacy and constant vigilance. Our 
bicameral Congress was designed to be slow 
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and deliberative. The jUdiciary is supposed a state, a governor's response is usually to 
to be even more unhurried and circumspect. call the President. 
But the President must often act instantly and Other structural evidence shows the 
decisively, and unlike the other two President's unique position in the 
branches, is on call to do so 24 hours a day, government. Congress does not reconstitute 
365 days a year. As one of us has written itself when an emergency occurs during 
elsewhere: recess; it is up to the President to convene 
it. Additionally, the President is the only 
Constitutionally speaking, the 
President never sleeps. The 
President must be ready, at a 
moment's notice, to do whatever it 
takes to preserve, protect, and 
defend the Constitution and the 
American people: prosecute wars, 
command anned forces (and nuclear 
weapons), protect Americans 
abroad, negotiate with heads of 
state, and take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed. 3 
This obviously distinguishes the 
President from legislators and judges, but it 
also makes the President distinct from 
governors. While governors do have some 
continuous responsibilities, they have fewer 
problems of such extreme importance to 
cope with on a moment's notice. To take 
two obvious examples, they do not deal with 
foreign policy emergencies and they do not 
command nuclear weapons. And in practice, 
significantly, when an emergency does strike 
official with a constitutionally-defined instant 
understudy. Constitutionally, the Vice 
President's main job is to be ready to assume 
the mantle of state at a moment's notice. 
For all of these reasons, any 
distraction of the President from his duties is 
much more significant than similar distractions 
of these other, prosecutable officials, and has 
a much bigger impact on the well-being of 
the nation and all its People. 
State Prosecution 
The question of prosecuting the 
President is really two questions: one state 
and one federal. We'll start with the former: 
Can a sitting President be prosecuted by state 
officials for violating state criminal laws? 
The argument that sitting Presidents 
cannot be so prosecuted begins with the 
venerable case of McCulloch v. Maryland. 
Under McCulloch, state officials are not 
allowed to obstruct 
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the measures of a government 
created by others as well as 
themselves, for the benefit of others 
in common with themselves. The 
difference is that which always exists, 
and always must exist, between the 
action ofthe whole on a part, and 
the action of a part on the whole.4 
In other words, a single state cannot use its 
power to derail the functioning of the United 
States. 
Does this prove too much? Surely 
the Constitution does not give federal officials 
license to become a lawless marauding 
horde. Surely indeed, but McCulloch 
provides a helpful dividing line: 
If we apply the principle for which 
the state of Maryland contends, to 
the constitution generally, we shall 
find it capable of changing totally the 
character of that instrument. We 
shall find it capable of arresting all 
the measures of the government, 
and of prostrating it at the foot of 
the states.5 
Ordinarily, in other words, states can enforce 
their laws and prosecute federal officials 
without "arresting" and "prostrating" the 
normal functions of the federal government. 
But this is not so with the President, and so 
under McCulloch they cannot prosecute him 
until he has left office. McCulloch dealt, of 
course, with Maryland's legislative power to 
tax a National Bank, not with any state 
executive attempt to prosecute the President. 
But the principle is the same. To reiterate and 
paraphrase, no county prosecutor is allowed 
to "arrest[] all the [executive powers] ofthe 
government and prostrate(] it at the foot of 
the states." 
Importantly, this privilege is not 
designed to protect the President's personal 
interests (although it does, temporarily), but 
rather the public interest of the People-all 
the People of America-to have their chosen 
leader able to execute his duties "for their 
benefit." This right of all the People to a 
functioning government trumps the right of 
only a few of them to have an instant 
prosecution. 
A helpful example: Imagine that in 
April 1861, after the Civil War began but 
before his state had seceded, a local 
prosecutor in Virginia decided to prosecute 
President Lincoln. Would it make sense to 
say that Lincoln was subject to "arrest, 
imprisonment, or detention" at that crucial 
moment? Indeed, who is this local 
prosecutor that he could act in the name of 
the people of his county, at the expense of 
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the protection of all the People of the Union? 
If President Lincoln were held to answer for 
a crime, in whose name could he have been 
so held? The answer we will give below-
and more importantly, that the Constitution 
gives - is, in the name of All the People 
of America, through their chosen 
representatives. 
A skeptic might ask if a criminal 
prosecution would really be so disruptive. 
After all, in this day and age Presidents are 
often subject to crises that divert their 
attention. Since the executive branch is so 
big and has substantial inertia allowing it to 
function without the President around, would 
it really be such a crisis if the President had 
to face prosecution? With modern 
technology, couldn't a President even run the 
country from inside ajail cell? The skeptic 
misses a crucial point. We do not mind the 
President responding to a public crisis by 
diverting his attention from other matters, 
because that is precisely his job. If a war or 
a natural disaster requires his immediate 
attention, we expect him to be able to give 
it. The difference is that these so-called 
distractions are within the scope of his job. 
The presidency is designed to juggle a myriad 
of demands, but public ones. Mounting a 
pen;onal, criminal defense would be a serious 
drain on the President's ability to do this. 
"Is this necessarily so?" asks the 
skeptic. "Couldn't it be a minor violation that 
requires very little time at all?" Perhaps. But 
such lines are hard to draw, especially when 
they would be (necessarily) so politically 
charged. This political nature inherent in 
anything the President might do provides 
another answer. If the distraction of the 
President's crime is such that it is less 
disruptive for the President to just waive his 
immunity and plead guilty, he can always do 
just that. Ifhe refuses to waive his privilege 
and the political pressures persist, rendering 
him unable to execute his duties, he can be 
impeached and then prosecuted. More on 
that mechanism later. 
Our skeptic might still have nagging 
doubts. One is historical. In 1804, Vice 
President Aaron Burr killed Alexander 
Hamilton and was indicted in two states as a 
result. In 1973, Vice President Spiro Agnew 
faced prosecution too (though his was 
federal). No one successfully argued that 
these men should have been immune as a 
matter oftheir high constitutional rank - in 
fact the federal government in Agnew's case 
argued just the opposite.6 But Vice 
Presidents are not Presidents (to put it 
mildly). The government can certainly 
THE PRESIDENTIAL PRIVILEGE AGAINST PROSECUTION 15 
HeinOnline -- 2 NEXUS 16 1997
16 
function without them-at various points in 
our history, totaling almost forty years, we 
have not even had a Vice President. Although 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment dramatically 
narrows this window of vulnerability, our 
Constitution also allows Congress to provide 
leaves office." This "leaving office" can be 
hastened by an election or an impeachment. 
The statute oflimitations can be stayed. In 
short, the crime will out. 
Our argument for temporary 
immunity is far from novel. Listen to Vice 
President John Adams and 
President Nixon said that "if the Senator (later Chief Justice) 
President does it, it's not illegal" 
and the Supreme Court (in the 
case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald) 
essentially agreed with him. 
Oliver Ellsworth. A senator in 
conversation with them about 
presidential prosecutability 
asserted that the President was not 
for Presidential succession without Vice 
Presidents, making them, ultimately, a 
constitutional luxury. 
But at bottom, our skeptic asks, 
"isn't this supposed to be a government of 
laws, not men?" Certainly; we do not suggest 
otherwise. This temporary privilege from 
prosecution is less of a threat to the rule of 
the law than the immunity given to Presidents 
acting in their official capacities. President 
Nixon said that "ifthe President does it, it's 
not illegal" and the Supreme Court (in the 
case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald) essentially 
agreed with him.? That compromises the 
rule oflaw. By contrast, the privilege we 
assert says that, "if the President does it,8 
he can be held responsible for it after he 
above the laws, to which they 
replied that "[y]ou could only impeach him 
and no other process [ w]hatever lay against 
him."9 But then, the senator pointed out, a 
President committing murder on the streets 
could only be removed by impeachment. 
True, acknowledged Adams and Ellsworth, 
but "[ w ]hen he is no longer President, [y]ou 
can indict him."lo 
Federal Prosecution 
Most ofthese same arguments apply 
to federal prosecutions as well. The main 
differences are structural. Instead of the 
division of power between state and federal, 
it is the separation of powers between the 
judicial, legislative, and executive branches 
at work here. 
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Adams and Ellsworth agreed: "The 
President personally was not the subject to 
any process whatever ... For [that would] 
put it in the power of a common Justice to 
exercise any [a ]uthority over him and [s ]top 
the [w]hole [m]achine ofGovemment."11 
Thomas Jefferson, not usually an intellectual 
ally of Adams and Ellsworth on constitutional 
matters, clarified this further: "would the 
executive be independent of the judiciary, if 
he were subject to the commands of the 
latter, and to imprisonment for disobedience; 
if the several courts could ... withdraw him 
entirely from his constitutional duties?"12 
If the "common justice" is a state 
authority, this possibility raises the concerns 
already discussed. If the justice is federal, 
though, it raises separation of powers 
problems. First, it puts the entire executive 
branch at the mercy of the judiciary. Second, 
the Constitution designates Congress as the 
court that tries sitting Presidents. I 3 
This principle does have limits. 
Obviously, the judiciary has some injunctive 
power over the presidency when the latter 
is acting in its official capacity. It is not as if 
ongoing wrongdoing cannot be enjoined. But 
punishing a sitting President for a past, wholly 
completed, bad act is a very different thing. 
On this the Court has spoken instructively: 
It is settled law that the separation-
of-powers doctrine does not bar 
every exercise of jurisdiction over 
the President of the United States. 
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon; 
United States v. Burr; cf. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer. But our cases also have 
established that a court, before 
exercisingjurisdiction, must balance 
the constitutional weight of the 
interest to be served against the 
dangers of intrusion on the authority 
and functions of the executive 
branch. 14 
Prosecution ofthe President easily meets this 
standard of disruption. Indeed, if successful, 
it amounts to a de facto "removal" from 
office. 
For its part, the Constitution foresees 
only two ways of removing a disfavored 
President from office: voting him out and 
impeaching him.ls Of course, the President 
can always choose to resign or hand over 
power to the Vice President temporarily, just 
as he can choose to consent to prosecution. 
Without the background option of immunity 
from prosecution, however, this is no more 
a choice than is handing over your wallet to 
a mugger. As mentioned in the state context 
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too, the question is who can legitimately act 
against the President in this way. The answer 
once again is the chosen representatives of 
All the People, acting through the well-
designed mechanism of impeachment, and 
not a lone judge and a lone prosecutor, 
wielding the sword of federal criminal law 
against the swordbearer, the President. 
All of this might give our skeptic one 
reason to perk up. Ifthe President is the Chief 
Federal Prosecutor, why is there a separation 
of powers problem if he, in effect, 
prosecutes himself? This is a good structural 
question. There are two answers. First of 
all, if the President is prosecuted, it is most 
likely to be by an independent counsel (who 
is, as a political matter, usually a member of 
the other party, and is, as a factual matter, 
often going to err on the side of prosecution), 
not the Justice Department. If the President 
freely allows his regularly appointed 
lieutenants to pursue him, then there is no 
separation of powers problem. As for an 
independent counsel pursuing the President, 
the President can refuse to allow her to be 
appointed in the first place, and he can fire 
her ifhe so chooses as well. 
The case of Morrison v. Olson 
allowed independent counsels to be 
removable for cause only, but this was in the 
context of the prosecution of a lower 
executive official. If the President himselfis 
the target of the independent counsel, it is 
harder to see how the Justices could credibly 
uphold the "for cause" limitation by claiming 
that they "simply do not see how the 
President's need to control the exercise of 
[prosecutorial] discretion is so central to the 
functioning of the executive branch."16 
Obviously, the question of prosecuting the 
President is central to the functioning of the 
executive branch, in a unique way. If 
Congress has passed a statute that does not 
give the President this discretion, it has 
violated the separation of powers. If judges 
uphold it, they have too. 
Impeachment: First Things First 
Contrast the check-and-balance of 
impeachment, in which the Constitution 
specifically gives Congress and the Chief 
Justice the job of charging and "trying" the 
President. Structurally, impeachment fits 
neatly with the temporary nature of the 
President's privilege. The Constitution 
explicitly states that impeached officials are 
subject to "indictment, trial,judgment and 
punishment" after their conviction by the 
Senate. Of course, for other federal officials 
this does not preclude pre-impeachment 
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prosecution (as we have seen, the President 
is unique). But since the punishment for 
impeaclunent is specifically limited to removal 
(and disqualification) from office, and since 
regular prosecution is then possible, 
impeachment provides a constitutional 
method -removal - for prosecuting a 
President almost immediately without freezing 
the functions of the presidency. And while 
impeachment only comes into play for 
serious offenses (high crimes and 
misdemeanors) 
It certainly makes geographical sense to 
minimize disruption by trying the President 
down the street from his office instead of 
dragging him to a county courthouse 
thousands of miles away. 17 Also, it is harder 
to impeach than to indict, making it less likely 
that an impeachment will get to trial than in a 
regular criminal process, an important fact 
in this age of overcriminalization and rubber-
stamp grand juries. Finally, after 
impeachment and conviction, the President 
is replaced and 
this is as it should 
be: it is only for 
such senous 
offenses that a 
Few Presidents are saints, but 
who ultimately should decide 
the function of 
government 
whether they must stand trial for returns to full 
their al/eged sins? speed, while in a 
prosecution 
cannot simply wait for the expiration of the 
President's term. 
Doesn't impeachment freeze the 
functions of the presidency just as surely as 
a criminal prosecution would? Possibly, 
though not necessarily. For one thing, 
impeaclunent allows for a much more flexible 
and stripped-down version of procedure than 
do our courts. For another, the President is 
already institutionally equipped to deal with 
Congress; while impeachment is a rare 
event, it is much closer to the regular business 
of Presidents than is a criminal prosecution. 
criminal 
prosecution conviction is just the beginning 
of the disruption: who would be in charge of 
the Oval Office pending an appeal? 
Furthermore, even ifthe disruption 
of impeachment is no less than that of a trial, 
there is good reason for us to not mind. The 
disruption of impeachment is much more 
difficult to bring about; a prosecutor and a 
grand jury are much easier to convince than 
is half of the House of Representatives. 
Relatedly, and as we have been arguing all 
along, if we assume that the presidency is 
going to be disrupted, who is allowed, and 
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who do we want, to disrupt it? Few 
Presidents are saints, but who ultimately 
should decide whether they must stand trial 
for their alleged sins? A prosecutor and 
twenty-three grand jurors, or the 
representatives of half of "We the 
People" acting through explicit constitutional 
procedures? The Founders knew what they 
were doing when they designed the 
impeachment process. When a President is 
removed, it is not by an unaccountable state 
official or an even less accountable special 
prosecutor. It is done instead by the most 
august, most representative, most 
constitutionally elaborated, and most 
accountable deliberative body we have, the 
Congress. Aware that politics could enter 
into the equation, the Founders wisely and 
purposely put the final decision in the hands 
of the more deliberative Senate, and required 
a super-majority so that conviction of the 
President would not be possible without the 
assent of at least some of his political allies. 18 
Impeachment, then, is the sole means of 
removing a sitting President, and is a good 
one at that. 
There is one more point to be made. 
In the Founding debates, in a discussion of 
limiting the President's pardon power, the 
scenario of a malfeasing President pardoning 
his friends was raised. James Wilson 
responded to this scenario with a 
reassurance that, "[i]f[the President] himself 
be a party to the guilt he can be impeached 
and prosecuted."19 Besides hinting at what 
we have said about impeachment necessarily 
preceding prosecution,20 this introduces us 
to another structural consideration, the 
pardon. Then-Solicitor General Robert 
Bork argued that, logically, Presidents must 
be immune from federal prosecution, since 
they can always just pardon themselves. As 
one of us has argued at length elsewhere, 
though, Presidents cannot pardon 
themselves.21 Among otherreasons, the self-
pardon would be permanent, not temporary, 
and would thus place the President above 
the rule oflawP And anyway, it cannot be 
so lightly assumed that a President facing 
prosecution would pardon himself, since 
doing so would almost certainly guarantee 
an impeachment (potentially as a [self-] 
bribe, one of the enumerated bases of 
impeachment), and might even be 
prosecutable as a crime (public misconduct, 
obstruction of justice, etc.) in itself. 
Conclusion 
The Constitution provides for a 
government oflaws, not men. At the same 
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time, the People have the right to a vigorous 
Executive who protects and defends them, 
their country, and their Constitution. 
Temporary immunity is the only way to 
ensure both of these things. It prevents 
relatively unrepresentative actors from 
holding the country hostage, leaving 
discretion instead in the proper, more 
representative hands of Congress. By leaving 
the constitutional mechanism of impeachment 
available, it ultimately holds the President 
responsible for his actions. Put simply, it 
makes good constitutional sense. 
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